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Comparative Law and Finance: Past, Present and Future Research 
 
by 
 
MATHIAS SIEMS AND SIMON DEAKIN
*
 
―Lawyers don‘t do empirical work.  
They just argue with each other.‖ 
(Andrei SHLEIFER [2005]) 
1 Introduction 
Does law matter for financial development? There are various ways in which we 
could attempt to answer this question. For example, historical studies can unearth 
the factors behind the development of financial markets in particular countries 
(e.g. CHEFFINS [2008] and DEAKIN [2009] for the UK). Another approach is to 
interview market participants and policy makers in order to understand the institu-
tional and political-economy factors shaping firms‘ access to finance (e.g. AR-
MOUR AND LELE [2009] for India). Most influential, however, is a line of research 
which this article refers to as ―comparative law and finance‖. This research 
method codes how well the laws of different countries protect certain interests, 
such as those of shareholders or creditors. The resulting data can then be used in 
order to test which legal institutions (if any) matter for the growth of financial 
markets. 
The ―comparative law and finance‖ approach is not without problems. Section 
2 of this article outlines how this line of research has been conducted by financial 
economists including La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (hence-
forth LLSV). Section 3 presents ―a legal response‖ to these studies. This response, 
which is partly based on our previous work, argues that LLSV have often misun-
derstood the content and operation of legal rules across countries. However, sec-
tion 4 makes clear that we do not dismiss the ―comparative law and finance‖ ap-
proach as such. In this section we report the main results of our own research, 
which has produced new longitudinal datasets for shareholder, creditor and 
worker protection. Section 5 concludes with further questions that will be tackled 
in our future research. 
                                                 
*
 Norwich Law School, University of East Anglia (corresponding author) and Centre 
for Business Research, University of Cambridge, UK. We gratefully acknowledge fund-
ing from the ESRC‘s ―World Economy and Finance‖ Programme, the Newton Trust, and 
the EU Sixth Research and Development Framework Programme (Integrated Project ―Re-
flexive Governance in the Public Interest‖). 
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2 The World According to LLSV 
The first LLSV studies examined the importance of shareholder and creditor pro-
tection across countries (LA PORTA et al. [1997], [1998], and LA PORTA, LOPEZ-
DE-SILANES, AND SHLEIFER [1999]). The main hypothesis was – and still is – that 
the greater the protection afforded to shareholders and creditors by a country‘s 
legal system, the more external financing firms in that jurisdiction will be able to 
obtain. If good legal institutions can reduce the risk of investor expropriation ex 
post, then investors will be more willing to advance funds ex ante.  
A key step in the empirical methodology has been to quantify variations, across 
countries, in the extent to which certain types of legal rule exist. The resulting in-
dices make it possible to correlate indicators capturing aspect of legal rules and 
institutions with relevant economic variables. For instance, in the 1998 ―Law and 
Finance‖ study LLSV used eight variables as proxies for the strength of share-
holder protection in 49 countries. These variables coded the law for ―one share, 
one vote,‖ ―proxy by mail allowed,‖ ―shares not blocked before the meeting,‖ 
―cumulative voting,‖ ―oppressed minorities mechanism,‖ ―pre-emptive rights to 
new issues,‖ ―share capital required to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting,‖ 
and ―mandatory dividend.‖ Next, the authors drew on the aggregate value of these 
proxies as the independent variable in statistical regressions. Their main finding 
was that greater shareholder protection leads to more dispersed shareholder own-
ership, which can be seen as a proxy for developed capital markets (LA PORTA et 
al. [1998, pp. 1151f.]). 
In the last ten years LLSV and other researchers developed further indices for a 
range of different aspects of the law relating to the business enterprise. For in-
stance, there are now also datasets relating to the quality of government (LA 
PORTA, LOPEZ-DE-SILANES, AND SHLEIFER [1999]), regulations governing firm 
start-up (DJANKOV et al. [2002]); contract enforcement (DJANKOV et al. [2003]); 
securities regulation (LA PORTA, LOPEZ-DE-SILANES, AND SHLEIFER [2006]); la-
bour regulation (BOTERO et al. [2004]); private credit (overlapping with the earlier 
―creditor rights‖ index) (DJANKOV et al. [2007]); and self-dealing rules (overlap-
ping with the earlier ―antidirector rights‖ index) (DJANKOV et al. [2008]). 
The main finding of all of these studies is that legal rules have a quantifiable 
effect on financial development. Thus, LLSV and others therefore often drew on 
indicators of stock market development as dependent variables. In some studies, 
however, other dependent variables were used such as the duration of court pro-
ceedings (DJANKOV et al. [2002]) or the unemployment rate (BOTERO et al. 
[2004]). 
A secondary finding is that the quality of legal institutions varies systemati-
cally with the ―origin‖ of a country‘s legal system, that is, whether it falls into the 
English ―common law‖, or French, German or Scandinavian ―civil law‖ systems 
(see also GLAESER AND SHLEIFER [2002], ROE [2006]). LLSV contend that legal 
origins thus determine the financing of corporate growth, and through that and 
other channels, the nature of the financial system and ultimately, perhaps, overall 
economic growth. Econometrically, the first studies used legal origin as an in-
strumental variable in order to address the problem of endogeneity since the direc-
tion of causation between law and economic variables was not clear (see still LA 
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PORTA, LOPEZ-DE-SILANES, AND SHLEIFER [2006, p. 27]). However, LSSV now 
take the view that legal origin cannot be regarded as a good instrument for the ef-
fects of legal rules, since it is likely to influence economic outcomes through a 
variety of mechanisms, of which the content of legal rules is just one. Instead, le-
gal origin, they suggest, should simply be regarded as an exogenous or causal 
variable in its own right (LA PORTA, LOPEZ-DE-SILANES, AND SHLEIFER [2008, 
p. 298]). The usual result is that the belonging of a country to the ―common law‖ 
family is positively related to financial development. 
The importance of these studies cannot be underestimated. The LLSV articles 
are among the most cited papers in economics and law.
1
 Moreover, the EU Com-
mission‘s impact assessment on the Directive on Shareholders‘ Rights explicitly 
referred to them in order to justify their recent reform (EU COMMISSION [2006]). 
In contrast to traditional comparative law
 
(see SIEMS [2007b]) the LLSV studies 
also have a considerable political impact because the World Bank uses them in 
order to asses and promote a particular way of legal development. Based on the 
numerical benchmarks of its Doing Business Report (WORLD BANK [2008]) it 
puts pressure on developing and transition economies, which often depend on the 
World Bank‘s funding. In addition, developed countries too take the Doing Busi-
ness Report seriously, for instance, France where the government has set up its 
own programme on the ―Attractivité économique du droit‖ in order to challenge 
the World Bank‘s findings.2 
3 A Legal Response 
LLSV and their co-authors are financial economists. However, at its core they 
conduct a legal analysis because they are interested in the functioning of legal 
rules and the classification of legal systems. To be sure, their methodology is fun-
damentally different from doctrinal legal research. Thus, it was only a matter of 
time until LLSV and legal research ―clashed‖. 
 
                                                 
1
 The 1998 article by LLSV on ―Law and Finance‖ displays 763 citations in RePEc, 
making it one of the top 1% articles (http://ideas.repec.org/top/top.item.nbcites.html). In 
SSRN there are even 1358 citations (http://ssrn.com/abstract=139134). In the legal data-
base ―Westlaw‖ there are 260 hits (search for ―La Porta et al.― & ―Law and Finance― in 
WORLD-JLR on 12 April 2008); see SIEMS [2008c, pp. 355f.]. 
2
 See http://www.gip-recherche-justice.fr/aed.htm.  
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3.1 Classification: What are LLSV Doing? 
A lawyer interested in LLSV‘s research would first try to distinguish their ap-
proach from related methods. In Figure 1 (below) LLSV‘s approach is called 
―Comparative Law and Finance‖, being a subcategory of other forms of lexime-
trics, numerical and statistical comparative law, and law and finance. 
Figure 1 
Classification of LLSV‘s research 
(1) Leximetrics 
 
 
―Leximetrics‖ is the widest term because it refers to every quantitative meas-
urement of law (LELE AND SIEMS [2007a] borrowing from COOTER AND GINS-
BURG [2003]). This research can be based on a comparison between different 
countries but it would also be possible to focus on one country only, for instance, 
by coding the law across time. The LLSV studies fall into the former category and 
therefore belong to ―Numerical Comparative Law‖, which denotes every quantita-
tive comparative methodology using legal data (see SIEMS [2005a]). But again, 
numerical comparative law covers two types of research: it can refer to an analysis 
which tries to establish a causal link between law and other variables, or it can 
concern simple counts, for instance, citation counts between courts of different 
countries (e.g. SIEMS [2009b]). LLSV‘s regressions try to establish a causal link, 
and therefore they belong to the former category, which can also be called ―statis-
tical comparative law‖ (see SIEMS [2008c]). 
Finally, it remains to be clarified how ―Statistical Comparative Law‖ is related 
to ―Law and Finance‖, the term used by LLSV themselves. These two categories 
are not identical. On the one hand, statistical comparative law is not always about 
law and finance; thus research has examined whether differences in criminal law 
have an impact on the crime rate in different countries (e.g. DONOHUE AND LEVITT 
(2) Numerical Comparative Law 
 
   (3) Statistical Comparative Law 
 
              (4) Law and Finance 
 
 
 
 
       (5) Comparative  
      Law and Finance 
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[2001]). On the other hand, law and finance research is not always comparative. 
For example, one can refer to event studies which tried to establish whether and 
how a specific legal change influenced the stock market in the same country (see 
BHAGAT AND ROMANO [2007]). The LLSV research is situated at the overlap be-
tween statistical comparative law and law and finance, which can be merged into 
the term ―Comparative Law and Finance‖. 
3.2 Doubts about the Quantification of the Law 
LLSV deserve the credit for initiating systematic research on the relationship be-
tween a country‘s legal institutions and its financial system. However, the recep-
tion by the legal academia has been somewhat cool. This should not be a surprise 
because legal academics are typically hesitant about methods which require a re-
duction of complexity. For instance, criticising law and economics, KRONMAN 
[1993, p. 153] holds that law and other academic fields are different because law‘s 
―dominant mood is [...] one of skepticism and doubt rather than the optimistic 
faith in abstraction that animates every genuinely scientific branch of study‖. And 
BARONDES [1995, pp. 174, 225] objects that copying statistical methods from sci-
ence only leads to an inconsistent pseudo-science, and reflects an incomplete ef-
fort to incorporate an analysis from another discipline into legal scholarship. 
Moreover, comparative law and finance can be challenged from a comparative 
law perspective (see SIEMS [2005a]). LLSV and colleagues focus on the coding of 
legal rules. However, according to the established methodology (for the following 
see ZWEIGERT AND KÖTZ [1998, pp. 38, 43], DE CRUZ [1999, pp. 213, 218, 227, 
230]) comparative law should not be done by simply listing the legal similarities 
and differences. Comparative law gives rise to particular methodological issues, 
because, for instance, linguistic and terminological problems, cultural differences 
between legal systems, the potential for arbitrariness in the selection of objects of 
study, and the danger of ignorance of extralegal rules have to be considered. The 
starting point of comparative law is, therefore, the test of functionality. The initial 
question should not just refer to the law of one legal system, but should be posed 
in purely functional terms. Yet, in comparative law and finance it is typically just 
asked whether one specific legal rule does or does not exist in different countries. 
This disregards other legal solutions whose effect is similar, but use different 
ways of reaching the same goal. In addition, extralegal factors have to be consid-
ered. The comparative method has to go beyond purely legal devices, because a 
specific function may be performed by a legal rule in one country and by an extra-
legal phenomenon in another country. It is necessary to understand the ―law in 
context‖. Because the legal system is a subsystem of the society, the comparative 
lawyer has to evaluate the solution to a legal problem in terms of its particular his-
toric, social, cultural, and economic background. The simplicity offered by com-
parative law and finance may, therefore, be misleading. 
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3.3 Doubt about the Specific Numbers 
More specifically, lawyers found it highly problematic how LLSV and colleagues 
have selected and coded particular legal variables. Thus, it is doubted whether 
their legal indices provide an accurate numerical description of the laws of differ-
ent countries.  
To elaborate, the first problem is that these studies are often based on very lim-
ited numbers of variables, which do not provide a meaningful picture of the spe-
cific area of law. This is most apparent for the coding of shareholder protection 
(see LELE AND SIEMS [2007a, pp. 19ff.]). LLSV just use eight variables (see sec-
tion 2, above) in order to determine the strength of shareholder protection in dif-
ferent countries. However, these variables do not capture the most significant as-
pects of the law. For instance, although some of their variables deal with different 
aspects of shareholders‘ voting power, they miss the more crucial question of the 
extent of this power, i.e. the issues over which the shareholders in a general meet-
ing can exercise decision-making power. LLSV‘s choice of variables also suffers 
from a US bias. This fact has been nicely illustrated in a study in which a German 
scholar (BERNDT [2002, pp. 17f.]) constructed an ―alternative minority protection 
index‖,
 
on the basis of what he believed to be more important rules for minority 
shareholder protection. He omitted ―shares not blocked‖ and the ―oppressed mi-
norities mechanism‖ and instead included two new variables: ―minority protection 
regarding authorised capital‖ and ―minority protection regarding share repur-
chases‖. It is little surprise that, on the resultant index, Germany performed better 
than the US. 
To be fair, some of the more recent studies consider a wider range of variables: 
BOTERO et al.‘s [2004] index of labour regulation, for example, consists of 60 
variables, and has been shown to produce outcomes which are consistent with in-
dices drawn up using different methodologies, such as large-scale surveys of the 
opinion of lawyers and industrial relations practitioners (CHOR AND FREEMAN 
[2005]). However, the LA PORTA, LOPEZ-DE-SILANES, AND SHLEIFER [2006] index 
on securities law can again be challenged because its variables are wholly derived 
from US law without looking at alternative approaches of other countries (SIEMS 
[2005b, p. 301]). Thus, the LLSV research is often just a ―hidden benchmarking‖, 
which measures which legal systems most closely resemble the US model. 
Secondly, for any index to be a meaningful representation of the effects of le-
gal rules across different jurisdictions, it must contain coding that is transparently 
accurate and consistent. On a general level the problem is that the definitions of 
some of the LLSV variables are not precise enough, for instance, because it is not 
made clear whether to code only mandatory or also default rules (LELE AND SIEMS 
[2007a, pp. 21, 26f.]). More specifically, when the coding of LLSV‘s index on 
shareholder protection was checked by independent experts, numerous coding er-
rors were revealed (BRAENDLE [2006, pp. 263ff.], COOLS [2005, pp. 697–736]). 
SPAMANN [2006] and [2008] even re-coded the entire shareholder protection in-
dex with the result that most of the claimed effects disappeared. In the light of this 
finding, even some of the original authors of the studies accepted that this index 
was not entirely robust (DJANKOV et al. [2008]). 
  
8 
A third problem is that the variables of each index are usually simply aggre-
gated. This raises the question if all variables are really equally important. Going 
further, it is possible to argue that the scores given to particular variables or 
groups of variables should be weighted on a country-by-country basis to reflect 
the comparative law principle of functional equivalents: the same variable may 
play a completely different functional role in different countries, or different vari-
ables may play the same role, with their relative important varying from one con-
text to another (AHLERING AND DEAKIN [2007, p. 884]). To take an example: self-
regulatory takeover codes are generally thought to play a major role in underpin-
ning minority shareholder rights and encouraging the dispersion of ownership in 
some common law systems, such as the UK and Australia, but this type of regula-
tion is absent in the United States, where certain specific rules of securities law, 
the law of fiduciary duties and a more permissive approach to shareholder-led liti-
gation play a similar role (ARMOUR AND SKEEL [2007]). 
This problem of aggregation can also be seen in the World Bank‘s Doing Busi-
ness Report. This report (see section 2 above) includes an ―ease of doing business 
index‖ which aggregates various indices in order to rank all the legal systems in 
the world in terms of their efficiency in fostering business. According to this ―ag-
gregate of everything‖ Taiwan, Tonga, Slovakia and Saudi Arabia rank similarly 
(ranks 34–38). However, given the differences between these countries, it is 
doubtful whether this really tells us anything about these legal systems (see SIEMS 
[2007b]). 
3.4 Doubts about Legal Origins 
LLSV and colleagues have usually found that the quality of legal institutions var-
ies systematically between common law and civil law countries, and that belong-
ing to the ―common law‖ family is positively related to financial development 
(see section 2, above). This revival of ―legal families‖ (or ―legal origins‖) may 
surprise modern comparative lawyers, who increasingly emphasise the limitations 
of this categorisation. 
First, some legal scholars doubt whether the distinction between ―common 
law‖ and ―civil law‖ can be justified from an historical perspective (VOGENAUER 
[2005, p. 483], ZIMMERMANN [1998, p. 281]). More specifically, VAGTS [2000, 
pp. 598f.] criticized the use of the civil law v. common law distinction by LLSV, 
because, with respect to commercial and corporate law, international trade and 
legal transplants had always existed, and therefore a strict division between legal 
families did not fit. Indeed, the origins of company law were very similar in all 
―origin countries,‖ namely the establishment of colonial corporations by English, 
Dutch, and French merchants (SIEMS [2008b, pp. 18f.]. And later on, interconnec-
tions between the different countries continued, and thus it is no surprise that by 
the end of the nineteenth century the most important features of company law 
were relatively uniform across countries (HANSMANN AND KRAAKMAN [2001, 
pp. 439f.]). 
Secondly, modern trends make the common law/civil law distinction even less 
persuasive. Today we cannot talk about national legal systems which just exist 
side by side. Since law is becoming international, transnational, or even global, 
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looking at legal families is seen as less important (e.g., ÖRÜCÜ [2004, p. 361], 
HUSA [2004]). This impact of globalisation and internationalisation is particularly 
important for commercial laws. For example, cross-border listings, cross-border 
investments, international corporate governance codes, and international stock-
exchanges are not captured by the old distinction of legal families. 
Thirdly, LLSV and colleagues assume that we can easily classify all countries 
of the world into common law and civil law countries. This is based on the belief 
that the laws of the origin countries simply spread throughout the world through 
conquest, colonisation, and imitation (see also BECK AND LEVINE [2005, 
pp. 258ff.]). However, this idea of a mere copying disregards: the ongoing influ-
ence of their pre-transplant law; the mixtures and modifications at the moment 
when some copying of foreign law occurs; and the post-transplant period, in 
which the transplanted law may be altered (or at least applied differently from the 
origin country). It can therefore be shown that LLSV and colleagues have as-
signed many Eastern European, Asian, African and Latin American legal systems 
to a particular legal origin without any sound basis, making the claim about the 
superiority of the common law highly doubtful (SIEMS [2007a, pp. 62–70]). 
Fourthly, it is not clear why in substance we may expect differences between 
civil law and common law countries. The main assumption of LLSV is that the 
common law tradition is characterised by independent judges and juries, relatively 
weaker reliance on statutes, and the preference for contracts and private litigation 
as a means of dealing with social harms, whereas the civil law tradition is charac-
terised by state-employed judges, great reliance on legal and procedural codes, 
and a preference for state regulation over private litigation (see e.g. LA PORTA, 
LOPEZ-DE-SILANES, AND SHLEIFER [2006, p. 14]). 
LLSV base this claim on mainstream comparative law books (e.g. DAVID AND 
BRIERLEY [1995], ZWEIGERT AND KÖTZ [1998]). However, this ignores that the 
same books vigorously emphasise the limits of the common law/civil law divide. 
According to DAVID AND BRIERLEY [1995, p. 21] ―it is no more than a didactic 
device‖; and according to ZWEIGERT AND KÖTZ [1998, p. 72] ―any division of the 
legal world into families is a rough and ready device. It can be useful for the nov-
ice by putting the confusing variety of legal systems into some kind of loose or-
der, but the experienced comparatist will have developed a ‗nose‘ for the distinc-
tive style of national legal systems‖. 
In particular in commercial law, which is the main concern of the LLSV stud-
ies, it is hard to justify an epistemological distinction between common law and 
civil law countries. For instance, the sources of company law, securities law, in-
solvency law, and labour regulation, are mainly codified in the entire world, even 
in common law countries (e.g. LELE AND SIEMS [2007b, p. 5]). It is also not self-
evident that court-decisions play a larger role in common law than in civil law 
countries. For example, case law is not very important in English securities law, 
whereas, despite the lack of any specific provision, the German Supreme Court 
has recently established the possibility that in case of securities fraud investors 
can sue the deceiving directors for damages (see SIEMS [2005b, p. 304]). 
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3.5 Conclusion 
The foregoing critique may lead some lawyers to the conclusion that the ―com-
parative law and finance‖ approach should not be pursued. This reaction may not 
surprise LLSV and colleagues since one of them already complained that ―law-
yers don‘t do empirical work. They just argue with each other‖ (SHLEIFER 
[2005]). However, a more reasonable response is that it has to be possible to ―do 
better‖ than LLSV. The next section addresses how we have tried – and are still 
trying – to achieve this. 
4 New Time-Series Evidence on Shareholder, Creditor and Worker Protection 
This section derives from a project on ―Law, Finance, and Development‖ based at 
the Centre for Business Research (CBR) of the University of Cambridge. The 
overall aim of the CBR project is to review the mechanisms by which legal insti-
tutions influence financial systems and thereby affect economic development. It is 
an interdisciplinary project combining qualitative and quantitative research meth-
odology to yield a uniquely complete set of empirical results. The research is be-
ing carried out by a team of economists and lawyers working closely together. 
The following will focus on the quantitative part of our research.
3
 
4.1 Index Construction 
In the CBR project we construct new time-series indices on shareholder, creditor 
and worker protection in order to test which legal rules (if any) affect financial 
development. This is conducted in two steps. In a first step we have produced lon-
gitudinal datasets covering the period 1970–2005 for France, Germany, India, the 
UK and the US. These indices cover a wide range of variables: 60 for shareholder 
protection, 44 for creditor protection and 40 for worker protection. In total, these 
three indices therefore code for (60 + 44 + 40) × 36 × 5 = 25,920 observations. 
In a second step we extend our research to 25 countries. The countries repre-
sented are a range of developed systems (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US); developing countries (Argen-
tina, Brazil, Chile, India, Malaysia, Mexico, South Africa); and transition systems 
(China, Czech Republic, Latvia, Russia, Slovenia, Turkey). However, we only 
examine the period 1995–2005 and we also reduce the number of variables. The 
period was chosen in order to identify a period of time in respect of which all sys-
tems were undergoing a general move to liberalise their economies, as part of 
which legal reforms aimed at improving legal rules were on the agenda. The ex-
                                                 
3
 For our qualitative and theoretical research see e.g. BUCHANAN AND DEAKIN 
[2008] (on Japan); SCHNYDER [2008] (on Sweden and Switzerland); ARMOUR AND 
LELE [2009] (on India); CANKAR, DEAKIN, AND SIMONETI [2007] (on Slovenia); DE-
AKIN [2009] and SIEMS [2007a] (on legal origins); AHLERING AND DEAKIN [2007] (on 
institutional complementarity); SIEMS [2006b] (on legal adaptability). 
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tended shareholder index has just been completed; the datasets for creditor and 
worker protection are currently being constructed. 
The full text of these indices and datasets, plus detailed explanations, can be 
found online.
4
 Here, for purposes of illustration, it is sufficient to present extracts 
of the shareholder protection index (Table 1) and of the UK coding (Table 2). 
Table 1 
Shareholder Protection Index (extract) 
Variables Description
5
 
I. Protection against Board and Management 
1. Powers of the  
general meeting 
... 
The following variables equal 0 if there is no power of the general 
meeting and 1 if there is a power of the general meeting. 
(1) Amendments of articles of association 
(2) Mergers and divisions 
(3) Capital measures … 
Table 2 
Shareholder Protection United Kingdom (extract) 
Variable Years 
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 
I 1 1
6
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1
7
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
½
8
 ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ 1
9
 1 1 
 
These new datasets are based on coding methods which have sought to address 
limitations inherent in the LLSV studies. First, the selection of variables has con-
sidered that the same functional role may be performed in different jurisdictions 
by rules with different formal classifications. Consequently, our main aim was 
that our indices should get as close as possible to representing a coherent and 
meaningful characterisation of the law in any given jurisdiction. This choice of 
variables can never be entirely objective. However, we believe that even in the 
smaller set of variables (the ―second step‖) we have chosen good proxies for the 
main types of shareholder, creditor and worker protection of different legal sys-
tems. 
                                                 
4
 At http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/programme2/project2-20.htm. 
5
 Even where the description of the variables does not mention it specifically, we have 
given intermediate scores wherever necessary. 
6
 CA 1948, ss. 10, 23; CA 1980 Sch. 3 paras 2, 6. 
7
 CA 1948, ss. 206, 209; CA 1985, ss. 425, 427. 
8
 CA 1948, ss. 61(2), 66(1); CA 1985, 121, 135 for alteration and reduction of capital. 
9
 CA 1980, s. 14; CA 1985 s. 80 for allotment of shares. 
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Secondly, our indices take into account a wider range of legal information. 
Whereas LLSV focused almost exclusively on ―positive‖ legal rules, we include 
self-regulatory codes and other sources of norms which have de facto binding ef-
fect. We therefore include norms deriving from takeover and corporate govern-
ance codes which only feature to a marginal extent in the LLSV indices. We also 
code for particularly significant judicial decisions. Moreover, we code for a wider 
range of values when considering the effects of a given rule. Many of the LLSV 
codings use binary variables, assuming that a given rule either applies or it does 
not. In practice, many rules of company and securities law are ―default rules‖ 
which may apply or not depending on how the parties to particular transactions 
choose to deal with them. The norms of corporate governance codes which follow 
the ―comply or explain‖ approach offer an illustration of this: companies have a 
choice of either conforming to the relevant norm, or disclosing their reasons for 
not complying with it. But this is also a feature of many statutory rules of core 
company law. To code for these variations we use a wider range of values within 
the 0–1 scale. 
Thirdly, our indices are all longitudinal. We code for legal rules as they have 
evolved over time. This is a far from straightforward process. It means that we 
have to rely on the tools of legal research to examine the state of law going back a 
number of years; evidence on the state of law as seen by practising lawyers, a 
source of information which has usefully supplemented the core LLSV indices 
(see, e.g., DJANKOV et al. [2008]) is not available on an historical basis. However, 
the advantage is that we are able to capture the dynamics of legal change over 
time. Such an approach may shed light on several of the contested issues, namely: 
how, if at all, the structure of legal institutions influences the content and efficacy 
of legal rules; whether the differences between legal systems are reducing over 
time; and whether legal reforms stimulate financial and economic development, or 
vice versa. 
4.2 How Well are shareholders, Creditors and Workers Protected? 
In order to determine the strength of shareholder, creditor and worker protection 
one can simply aggregate all variables from each of our indices. For instance, 
Figure 2 represents how shareholder protection law has developed in France, 
Germany, India, the UK and the US from 1970 to 2005. Equivalent pictures have 
been created for creditor and worker protection (see ARMOUR et al. [2009a], DE-
AKIN et al. [2007]). Table 3 summarises the results of all five-country aggregates. 
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Figure 2 
Aggregate Shareholder Protection (60 variables) 
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Source: LELE AND SIEMS [2007a]. 
Table 3 
Summary of Five-Country Aggregates 
 Shareholder protection Creditor protection Worker protection 
Strongest  
   protection  
UK, Germany, France UK, Germany Germany, France 
Weakest  
   protection  
US France and India US 
Direction  
   of change 
improved protection  
in all countries 
―uneven‖ development  
in all countries 
improved protection  
in most countries  
(but ―uneven‖ in UK) 
Pace  
   of change 
often incremental steps 
in all countries 
some leaps  
in most countries 
some leaps  
in UK and France;  
incremental steps  
in other countries 
 
Source: ARMOUR et al. [2009a]. 
 
There are a number of surprises regarding the strength of protection, for in-
stance, the weak protection of shareholders in the US, and the mixture between 
common law and civil law countries in the creditor protection index. Only with 
respect to worker protection we have the expected result that Germany and 
France, but not the common law countries, provide strong protection, reflecting 
the more extensive welfare systems of these countries. Of course, these overall 
aggregates only provide a very general picture. Thus, our research also reports 
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various sub-indices on shareholder protection (LELE AND SIEMS [2007a], [2007b], 
SIEMS AND LELE [2009], SIEMS [2006a], ARMOUR et al. [2009a]); worker protec-
tion (DEAKIN, LELE, AND SIEMS [2007]; ARMOUR et al. [2009a]) and creditor pro-
tection (ARMOUR et al. [2009a]). 
With respect to the direction of legal change, one also has to distinguish be-
tween the different areas of law. Shareholder protection has increased in all coun-
tries whereas the development of creditor protection and labour regulation has 
been more ―uneven‖. This general pattern is remarkably consistent across both 
civil and common law countries. Moreover, we examined whether there are corre-
lations between shareholder, creditor and worker protection in the individual 
countries. The result is that, as far as we find statistical significance, there is a 
positive correlation between the three areas of law, except in the UK where there 
is an inverse relationship between shareholder and creditor protection, on the one 
hand, and labour regulation on the other (DEAKIN AND SARKAR [2008]). Thus, the 
fact that countries react to the pressure of international capital markets by improv-
ing the protection of shareholders is not negatively correlated to changes in the 
protection accorded to creditors or, the UK aside, to workers. 
The pace of legal change is also different between shareholder protection on 
one hand and creditor and worker protection on the other. Since shareholder pro-
tection has changed in more incremental steps, this confirms the impact of a cor-
responding market pressure, whereas path dependencies have been more pro-
nounced in the other two areas of law. This is the case for all countries. We did 
not find that in some countries the legislators or courts acted more adaptable to 
external changes. 
The extended shareholder protection index (see section 4.1, above) confirms 
that most countries have improved the protection of shareholders (SIEMS [2008a]; 
ARMOUR et al. [2009b], [2009c]). Since this index has been coded more countries, 
we can also distinguish between different groups of countries. For instance, it can 
be observed that developed countries perform better than developing countries. 
Further, in average, English-speaking countries perform better than the other 
countries of our sample. However, this should not lead to the conclusion that the 
common law produces more efficient results (for this claim see section 2 above). 
Rather, it matters that common law countries, but typically not civil law countries, 
share a common language and therefore it is more likely that English-speaking 
transplant countries continue to take developments in their origin country into ac-
count (SIEMS [2008a, pp. 137–144]; see also SPAMANN [2009]). 
4.3 How Much do Legal Systems Differ? 
In order to determine the differences between countries, one may just examine at 
the aggregates of shareholder, creditor and worker protection. Then Figure 2 (see 
section 4.2, above) may give the impression that in 2001 the laws of the UK, In-
dia, France and Germany were identical because all four countries had approxi-
mately the same score of 38 out of 60 variables. This would, however, not be a 
fair assessment. As this Figure simply shows the aggregate of all the variables, it 
is perfectly possible and indeed is the case, that different variables have led to 
similar scores for the UK, India, France and Germany. Therefore to highlight the 
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differences between the countries with a view to identifying trends of convergence 
or divergence we have calculated the differences between each variable in the law 
of a particular legal system and the same variable in the law of the other countries. 
Subsequently, the absolute values of these differences have been added together.  
The results of this exercise have first been reported for shareholder protection 
(see LELE AND SIEMS [2007a] for the five-country index and SIEMS [2008a] for the 
extended shareholder protection index). In a second step, equivalent mathematical 
operations have been used for the five-country creditor and worker protection in-
dices. The result is that that the 25,920 observations of the initial three indices 
(see section 4.1, above) are transformed into 36 × 10 × 3 = 1,080 observations 
which indicate the differences between these five countries (SIEMS [2009a]). In 
particular, this data can be used in order to determine whether these legal systems 
have converged or diverged. 
Table 4 
Convergence or Divergence of Laws 
 Shareholder 
protection 
Creditor 
protection 
Worker 
protection 
Total 
conv. div. conv. div. conv. div. conv. div. 
France 2 2 2 2 1 3 5 7 
Germany 2 2 2 2 1 3 5 7 
India 2 2 2 2 1 3 5 7 
UK 4 0 3 1 1 3 8 4 
US 4 0 1 3 0 4 5 7 
Total 14 6 10 10 4 16 28 32 
 
 Shareholder 
protection 
Creditor 
protection 
Worker 
protection 
Total 
conv. id div. conv. id div. conv. id div. conv. id div. 
1970– 
   1978 
0 2 8 2 6 2 2 0 8 4 8 18 
1979– 
   1987 
4 0 6 4 0 6 1 1 8 9 1 20 
1988– 
   1996 
4 0 6 8 0 2 6 1 3 18 1 11 
1997– 
   2005 
9 0 1 4 0 6 4 3 3 17 3 10 
Source: SIEMS [2009a]. 
 
Table 4 shows that the laws have converged in shareholder protection, that they 
have diverged in worker protection, and that in creditor protection converging and 
diverging trends even out. It can also be seen that convergence is a recent phe-
nomenon. In the 1970s and 1980s, even shareholder protection diverged, whereas 
now there is even some convergence in worker protection. Distinguishing be-
tween the five countries, France, Germany and India have fairly balanced figures 
in all three categories. The UK law on shareholder and creditor protection has 
converged with most of the other countries. US shareholder protection law has 
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also converged, whereas US creditor and worker protection law has diverged from 
the others (see SIEMS [2009a], for explanations). 
4.4 Does Law Matter? 
The CBR-project also examines the ―comparative law and finance‖ claim that the 
quality of the law is reflected in a country‘s financial development. The methods 
are described in detail in the papers cited in Table 5 (below). In a nutshell, our 
econometric methodology can be explained as follows. With respect to the 36-
year time series we analysed the effects of shareholder protection in each of the 
countries separately, examining whether there is cointegration, i.e. a common 
long-run trend in legal and economic variables. Since the growing wealth of a 
country can have a positive effect on other economic data (such as stock market 
development), we included GDP (log or growth rate) as a control variable. The 
11-year time series has only been completed for shareholder protection (see sec-
tion 4.1, above). Here, we did not examine each country individually but used a 
panel data analysis. This enables us to test whether countries with high levels of 
shareholder protection had, as a result, more developed capital markets. It is of 
course the case that a number of other factors could have contributed to the devel-
opment of stock markets. Therefore we have controlled for factors such as the dot-
com bubble, the legal origin of a country and the quality of legal enforcement. 
Table 5 
Preliminary Econometric Results 
 Dependent  
variable 
Preliminary results 
Shareholder 
protection 
stock market 
development 
France, Germany, India, UK, US (FAGERNÄS, SARKAR, 
AND SINGH [2008], SIEMS AND LELE [2009]): (i) nega-
tive relationship between shareholder protection and 
stock market turnover ratio in France and the UK;  
(ii) no statistically significant relationship in other coun-
tries. 
Twenty-country index (ARMOUR et al. [2009c]): (i) 
negative relationship between shareholder protection 
and number of listed firms per capita; (ii) no statistically 
significant relationship regarding the other dependent 
variables. 
Creditor 
protection 
Bank credit India (DEAKIN, DEMETRIADES, AND GREGORY [2008]): 
positive relationship between banking system develop-
ment and the law on creditor contracts. 
Worker 
protection 
Employment 
growth  
and  
labour  
France, Germany, UK, US (DEAKIN AND SARKAR 
[2008]): (i) employment growth: positively related to 
French working time law, negatively related to US la-
bour regulation; (ii) labour productivity: positively re-
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productivity lated to German working time and dismissal law, and to 
US labour regulation; (iii) no statistically significant 
relationship in other respects. 
 
Some of the results of Table 5 confirm the ―quality of law‖ hypothesis. It was to 
be expected that the strengthening of the rights of secured creditors has helped to 
promote banking development in India. And it is also plausible that employment 
protection and working time legislation promote employment growth and labour 
productivity.
10
 However, it may be a surprise that some of our data show a nega-
tive relationship between shareholder protection and stock market development. 
Two specific explanations can be offered. On the one hand, this may reflect an 
excessive level of protection, as some studies of the impact of the US Sarbanes–
Oxley Act have pointed out (LITVAK [2007]). On the other hand, an increase in 
shareholder protection may lead to a higher level of merger and acquisition activ-
ity, with the result that the number of listed companies decreases (for the UK see 
COSH AND HUGHES [2009]). 
More generally, however, the question remains why in most instances we have 
not found any statistically significant relationship. Thus, one needs to reflect the 
general relationship between legal change, political economy factors, and eco-
nomic growth. The absence of a significant relationship can suggest that local 
conditions may be setting limits to the effectiveness of legal transplants, and/or 
that formal convergence of laws might be masking persistent underlying diversity. 
This perspective is consistent with a broader shift in the literature on law and de-
velopment. It can be shown that, in contrast to the assumption by LLSV and col-
leagues, legal rules are, to a significant degree, endogenous to the economic and 
political economy context of the systems in which they operate (see DEAKIN 
[2009]). However, we are still some way from fully understanding the processes 
involved in the law–economy relation. 
5 Research Topics for a “New Comparative Law and Finance” 
The insight that legal rules are endogenous to the economic and political context 
opens up a number of further questions. Building on the themes in our existing 
work, the first question which we plan to address is what factors shape legal and 
institutional change at national level. For instance, a ―new comparative law and 
finance‖ needs to understand how far diversity across legal systems can be ex-
plained by political-economy factors such as the level of democratisation, the na-
ture of voting systems, particular interest group configurations, and the extent of 
trade and market openness. Further topical sub-questions are how different legal 
and institutional systems respond to ―shocks‖ such as financial crises and corpo-
rate governance scandals as drivers of legal change, and how policy-makers might 
                                                 
10
 In an interesting paper not affiliated with our project ACHARYA, BAGHAI-WADJI, 
AND SUBRAMANIAN [2009] have found that there is a positive relationship between 
stringent labour laws and innovation. 
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factor these elements into more successful legal and policy frameworks for long-
run financial development. 
Secondly, we are going to consider the role of forces which potentially affect 
all systems in a globalised economy. Here, important questions are how far regu-
latory competition and harmonisation of norms lead to a reduction over time in 
the extent of cross-national diversity of legal systems, and whether there are sig-
nificant differences in the effectiveness and adaptability of legal systems accord-
ing to the extent to which they have been the recipients of legal transplants. 
Thirdly, ―new comparative law and finance‖ is still interested in the impact of le-
gal and policy change on the development of financial and other markets. Follow-
ing our research on shareholder, creditor and worker protection, we will therefore 
consider the following questions: What has been the economic impact of the in-
crease in shareholder protection through law which most countries have expe-
rienced over the past decade? Have recent changes in the law affecting creditor 
rights, in particular in the areas of secured credit and insolvency procedures, in 
several countries, had an impact on private credit, banking development and other 
credit market indicators? What are the impacts of labour law changes in term of 
productivity, equality and growth? And finally: How do legal reforms operate in 
systems where the legal infrastructure is comparatively new and where legal pro-
tections for contract and property rights are of recent origin? In such systems, are 
legal reforms and administrative interventions substitutes for each other, or do 
they operate in a mutually complementary way? These are some of the issues for 
future research to address. 
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